Affected versions of this crate would call Vec::set_len on an uninitialized vector with user-provided type parameter, in an interface of the HDR image format decoder. They would then also call other code that could panic before initializing all instances.

This could run Drop implementations on uninitialized types, equivalent to use-after-free, and allow an attacker arbitrary code execution.

Two different fixes were applied. It is possible to conserve the interface by ensuring proper initialization before calling Vec::set_len. Drop is no longer called in case of panic, though.

Starting from version 0.22, a breaking change to the interface requires callers to pre-allocate the output buffer and pass a mutable slice instead, avoiding all unsafe code.

A bug in the SmallVec::insert_many method caused it to allocate a buffer that was smaller than needed. It then wrote past the end of the buffer, causing a buffer overflow and memory corruption on the heap.

This bug was only triggered if the iterator passed to insert_many yielded more items than the lower bound returned from its size_hint method.

The flaw was corrected in smallvec 0.6.14 and 1.6.1, by ensuring that additional space is always reserved for each item inserted. The fix also simplified the implementation of insert_many to use less unsafe code, so it is easier to verify its correctness.

Thank you to Yechan Bae (@Qwaz) and the Rust group at Georgia Tech’s SSLab for finding and reporting this bug.

Affected versions of this crate did not guard against panic within the user-provided function f (2nd parameter of fn map_array), and thus panic within f causes double drop of a single object.

The flaw was corrected in the 0.4.0 release by wrapping the object vulnerable to a double drop within ManuallyDrop<T>.