This project might be open to known security vulnerabilities, which can be prevented by tightening the version range of affected dependencies. Find detailed information at the bottom.

Crate algorithmia

Dependencies

(11 total, 5 outdated, 3 possibly insecure)

CrateRequiredLatestStatus
 backtrace^0.30.3.75up to date
 base64^0.10.10.22.1out of date
 chrono ⚠️^0.40.4.41maybe insecure
 headers-ext^0.0.40.0.4up to date
 http ⚠️^0.1.151.3.1out of date
 hyper ⚠️^0.121.6.0out of date
 mime^0.3.130.3.17up to date
 reqwest^0.9.60.12.22out of date
 serde^1.01.0.219up to date
 serde_json^1.01.0.140up to date
 url^1.72.5.4out of date

Security Vulnerabilities

http: Integer Overflow in HeaderMap::reserve() can cause Denial of Service

RUSTSEC-2019-0033

HeaderMap::reserve() used usize::next_power_of_two() to calculate the increased capacity. However, next_power_of_two() silently overflows to 0 if given a sufficiently large number in release mode.

If the map was not empty when the overflow happens, the library will invoke self.grow(0) and start infinite probing. This allows an attacker who controls the argument to reserve() to cause a potential denial of service (DoS).

The flaw was corrected in 0.1.20 release of http crate.

http: HeaderMap::Drain API is unsound

RUSTSEC-2019-0034

chrono: Potential segfault in `localtime_r` invocations

RUSTSEC-2020-0159

Impact

Unix-like operating systems may segfault due to dereferencing a dangling pointer in specific circumstances. This requires an environment variable to be set in a different thread than the affected functions. This may occur without the user's knowledge, notably in a third-party library.

Workarounds

No workarounds are known.

References

hyper: Lenient `hyper` header parsing of `Content-Length` could allow request smuggling

RUSTSEC-2021-0078

hyper's HTTP header parser accepted, according to RFC 7230, illegal contents inside Content-Length headers. Due to this, upstream HTTP proxies that ignore the header may still forward them along if it chooses to ignore the error.

To be vulnerable, hyper must be used as an HTTP/1 server and using an HTTP proxy upstream that ignores the header's contents but still forwards it. Due to all the factors that must line up, an attack exploiting this vulnerability is unlikely.

hyper: Integer overflow in `hyper`'s parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header leads to data loss

RUSTSEC-2021-0079

When decoding chunk sizes that are too large, hyper's code would encounter an integer overflow. Depending on the situation, this could lead to data loss from an incorrect total size, or in rarer cases, a request smuggling attack.

To be vulnerable, you must be using hyper for any HTTP/1 purpose, including as a client or server, and consumers must send requests or responses that specify a chunk size greater than 18 exabytes. For a possible request smuggling attack to be possible, any upstream proxies must accept a chunk size greater than 64 bits.